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Rosenblatt: CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP

COMMENTS
CBS, INC. v. ASCAP
ANTITRUST LAw-Price-Fixing-Issuance of a blanket license to a

television network for nondramatic performing rights constitutes
price-fixing. 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
In CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 1 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that issuance of a blanket license 2 by the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)3 for its
nondramatic performing rights4 was a violation of section I of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 5 This decision will enable a television network to obtain a per use license 6 from ASCAP for the first time.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), must be licensed
to broadcast copyrighted music on its television network. ASCAP
and the individual copyright owners are the only authorized licensors of these performance rights. ASCAP offered its licensees a
1. 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
2. Under the terms of a blanket license, a licensee of the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) is authorized to use any or all of the
compositions in ASCAP's repertory for a fixed annual fee.
3. ASCAP is an unincorporated association of composers, authors, and publishers. Its members grant ASCAP the nonexclusive right to license performance of
their compositions, in exchange for a surveillance system to detect the unlicensed
use of compositions. Additionally, ASCAP distributes royalties to its members according to a schedule which reflects the use of their compositions. For a discussion
of ASCAP's history, see Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917); Finkelstein,
The Composer and the Public Interest-Regulation of Performing Right Societies, 19
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 275 (1954); Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 294 (1954); White, Musical Copyrights v. The Antitrust Laws, 30 NEB. L. REv.
50 (1950).
4. A nondramatic performing right is the right to broadcast a musical composition on television, radio, or in a restaurant or nightclub. This right does not include
the right to record the composition on film; such recording must be licensed separately, for ASCAP only licenses nondramatic performing rights. See CBS, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977); Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 283.
5. Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides in pertinent part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal ..
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
6. Under the terms of a per use license, an ASCAP licensee would pay according to its actual use of music. See CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 134 n.9 (2d Cir.
1977).
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blanket license for a fixed annual fee. CBS contended that, because
it would be impracticable to obtain rights from the individual
copyright owners, there was no realistic alternative to the blanket
license available to it. 7 Thus, CBS brought an antitrust action
against ASCAP, 8 alleging that ASCAP's issuance of a blanket
license violated sections 1 and 2 9 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
CBS sought an injunction directing ASCAP to initiate a per use
licensing scheme; in the alternative, CBS sought to enjoin the issuance of a blanket license to any television network. The district
court dismissed defendant's motion for summary judgment'0 on the
ground that material issues of fact existed." These issues were
whether a per use system of licensing was feasible and whether the
blanket license constituted price-fixing. After trial, the district
court l dismissed appellant's complaint on the ground that CBS did

not prove that the blanket license constituted price-fixing. 13 The

court of appeals, in reversing the district court decision,' 4 interpreted the case as presenting two issues: first, whether the issuance
of a blanket license to a television network was block-booking, 15
7. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d
130 (2d Cir. 1977). CBS sought a per use license because the fee charged for actual

use of music would be less than the fee charged for the blanket license.
8. With a few exceptions, every domestic copyrighted composition is in the repertory of either ASCAP or Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). BMI was another named
defendant. Its licensing scheme is similar to ASCAP's. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F.
Supp. 737, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), reo'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
9. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides in pertinent part: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
10. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), complaint dismissed, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 401.
12. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130
(2d Cir. 1977).
13. Id. at 780-81. The court dismissed the complaint "because CBS ... failed to
prove either that it purchased blanket licenses under compulsion or that the price it
paid was fixed." Id. at 781. The court further observed, in support of its dismissal,
that CBS could negotiate the blanket license fee with ASCAP. Thus, ASCAP was not
fixing prices. Id.
14. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
15. Block-booking, an illegal practice, "prevents competitors from bidding for
single features on their individual merits." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 156-57 (1948). "[T]he critical difference between an illegal licensing
arrangement and a legal one is the fact of coercion or compulsion by the licensor."
CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d
Cir. 1977). Thus, to dismiss appellant's complaint, the district court had to find that
an alternative to the blanket license was available to CBS. The district court found
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constituting a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act;
second, whether the blanket license constituted a restraint of trade
through price-fixing, a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court found the blanket license to be a restraint of
trade through price-fixing, and thus held for plaintiff.16
However, this price-fixing case was not thought to be a proper
one for the usual injunctive relief.1 7 The blanket license was not
enjoined, but its continued use was conditioned on ASCAP's establishing a per use licensing scheme. 18 In affording this relief, the
court sought to "ensure competition among the individual members
with respect to those networks which wish to engage in per use
licensing."19

The extraordinary relief granted in this case suggests that the
issue should not have been dealt with according to ordinary pricefixing standards. Although the result of the decision is sound insofar as it guarantees copyright protection while at the same time
assuring competition, the legal reasoning is strained by the pricefixing standard, which finds price-fixing per se illegal. The analytical problems in the decision could have been eliminated by substituting a standard different from the price-fixing standard. The
standard that would clarify the reasoning of this case would be a
reasonableness standard-the rule of reason. 20 The rule of reason
that CBS could negotiate directly with individual ASCAP members to obtain the use

of their music. The court of appeals accepted this finding as not clearly erroneous.
CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1977).
16. "[TIhe 'Per Se Rule with a Market-Functioning Exception' . . . holds that
price-fixing is per se illegal except where it is absolutely necessary for the market to
function at all." CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1977). The court of
appeals could not find that the blanket license was a market necessity because it
accepted the district court's finding that a direct market existed. See text accompanying notes 53 & 54 infra.
17. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977). Injunctive relief is
provided by § 16 of the Clayton Act: "Any person, firm, corporation, or association
shall be entitled.to sue for and have injunctive relief, . . .against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws .... upon ...

a showing that the danger

of irreparable loss or damage is immediate ....
" 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
18. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977).
19. Id.
20. The rule of reason applies to "combinations for the purpose of promoting
trade by achieving economies and by the introduction of more effective sales methods .... ." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 349 (1933)
(bituminous coal producers). See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945) (news distributing associations); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927) (sanitary pottery manufacturers); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911) (petroleum products producers). See also text accompanying notes
23, 73-77 infra.
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can be justified as an alternative method of analysis by recognizing
that the music industry is unique: "Analogy may be sought in each
field, but the practical complexities of licensing musical nondramatic performing rights can find no precise analogy anywhere." 21 In fact, on defendant's motion for summary judgment,

the district court recognized the need for applying the rule of
reason to CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP.22 The court stated that "[w]hen

economic realities of the market place dictate . . . the Supreme
Court has often applied the rule of reason test to activities which
would otherwise call for the per se test"' 23 of price-fixing.
This comment will examine the analytical problems in the court
of appeals's decision created by application of the per se price-fixing test. Additionally, it will be shown how these problems could

have been avoided by the use of the rule of reason.
ASCAP AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION

There is nothing novel about a clash between ASCAP and the
federal antitrust laws. In 1941, the Department of Justice, concerned with ASCAP's "overwhelming position in the entertainment
field" 24 brought an antitrust action against ASCAP. 2 5 This action
resulted in a consent decree 26 governing ASCAP's licensing of performance rights. The decree prohibited ASCAP from functioning as
the exclusive licensor of its members' compositions 2 7 and from interfering with individual members who wished to license their
compositions directly.2 8 However, this attempt to guarantee the
right of individual licensing was nullified by the consent decree's
condition requiring any royalties received directly by an ASCAP
21. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. 337 F. Supp. 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), complaint dismissed, 400 F. Supp.

737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
23. Id.
24. K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1967).
25. United States v. ASCAP, [1940-1943] Trade Cases 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
26. A consent decree is an agreement between the parties, whereby they consent "to the entry of... Final Judgment, without trial or adjudication of any issue
of fact or law . . . and without admission by defendant in respect to any such issue
.... " United States v. ASCAP, [1950-1951] Trade Cases T 62,594, at 63,748 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). This agreement is made under court sanction and binds only the consenting
parties. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 1977).
27. Section II(I) of the 1941 consent decree provides in pertinent part: "Defendant, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, shall not, with respect
to any musical composition, acquire or assert any exclusive performing right as agent,
trustee or otherwise on behalf of any copyright owner....
United States v. ASCAP,
[1940-1943] Trade Cases 1 56,104, at 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
28. Id.
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member to be paid to ASCAP. 2 9
A subsequent complaint against ASCAP dealt with the licensing of performance rights to motion picture theater operators. 30
The rental contract between motion picture producers and motion
picture theater operators required the theater operators to obtain a
performance license from ASCAP to exhibit any film. 3 1 Individual
ASCAP members were barred from licensing the performance
rights at the same time that the right to record the composition on
film was licensed to the producer. In Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 32 this arrangement was held to be an illegal monopoly3 3
and an illegal combination in restraint of trade. 34 Thus, ASCAP was
directed to "assign said performance rights to the owners of the
35
copyright of said musical compositions."
A further judicial attempt to assure the availability of individual licensing of performance rights occurred in 1950.36 Increasing
complaints to the Department of Justice emphasized the need for a
revision of the 1941 consent decree. 3 7 The result was a provision
allowing ASCAP members to retain any royalties that they received
as a result of individual licensing. 38 Granting this right to individual ASCAP members was thought to impair ASCAP's ability to
restrain trade. 39 In addition, the 1950 consent decree provided that
license fees must be reasonable. If a reasonable fee could not be
29. Section II(I)(a) of the 1941 consent decree provides in pertinent part: "[A]II
moneys derived from the issuance of licenses by the respective members of defendant [ASCAP shall] be paid by the licensee to defendant and distributed in the same
manner as other revenues .... IId. See Timberg, supra note 3, at 320.
30. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
31. Id. at 894.
32. 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See Timberg, supra note 3, at 299-300.
33. The court found a monopoly with respect to the licensing of performance
rights to motion picture theater operators. This finding was based on the ownership
by motion picture producers of music publishing companies which were ASCAP
members. Thus, the producer-publishers were receiving royalties from ASCAP by
requiring theater operators to obtain an ASCAP license. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
34. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
35. Id. at 900 n.2.
36. United States v. ASCAP, [1950-1951] Trade Cases 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
37. See Timberg, supra note 3, at 301.
38. Section IV of the 1950 consent decree prohibits ASCAP from "[Ilimiting,
restricting, or interfering with the right of any member to issue to a user nonexclusive licenses for rights of public performance .... " United States v. ASCAP,
[1950-1951] Trade Cases 62,595, at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
39. Note, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable Compromise, 1959 DuKE L.J. 258, 273.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

5

Hofstra Law
Review,
Vol.
LAW
REVIEW
HOFSTRA

6, Iss. 2 [1978],[Vol.
Art. 6:7 445

agreed upon by ASCAP and the licensee, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York was given the
40
authority to determine a fee.
In K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp. ,4 the Ninth Circuit relied on the revised consent decree to hold that ASCAP was
not engaged in price-fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. In K-91 a group of ASCAP members brought a
copyright infringement action against a Washington State radio station operator. Appellant, the radio station operator, was broadcasting musical compositions in the ASCAP repertory without permission. Appellant contented that an injunction against further
copyright infringement should not be granted because appellees
were guilty of price-fixing through the use of a blanket license. The
court rejected appellant's reasoning 4 2 and held "that as a potential
combination in restraint of trade, ASCAP [had] been 'disinfected'
by the [1950] decree." 43 The court reasoned that ASCAP was not
guilty of price-fixing, since the 1950 consent decree contained a
provision assuring a reasonable fee 44 and a provision assuring that
individual ASCAP members had the right to deal directly with
licensees. 45 "In other words, so long as ASCAP complie[d] with the
46
decree, it [was] not the price-fixing authority."
CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP 4 7 is the most recent case dealing with a
complaint lodged against ASCAP's blanket license. The CBS court,
unlike the K-91 court, found ASCAP guilty of price-fixing. 48 The
Second Circuit recognized that the blanket license did fix prices
62,595, at 63,754
40. United States v. ASCAP, [1950-1951] Trade Cases
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
41. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967).
42. See id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 38 & 39 supra.
46. K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1967).
47. 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
48. The Second Circuit did not find the consent decree decisive, as did the
Ninth Circuit in K-91. The Second Circuit did not accept the reasonableness of a
price as a defense to price-fixing. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 138-39 (2d Cir.
1977). Additionally, in CBS the blanket license was not deemed a market necessity,
as it was in K-91. See note 16 supra. The Ninth Circuit in K-91 had found a market
necessity because, as stated by the district court in CBS, "the parties stipulated that
it would be virtually impossible for broadcasters and copyright holders to arrange
separate licenses and payment for each performance on radio of a copyrighted composition." CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), complaint
dismissed, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1967)).
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and prevent competition. However, as will be shown, the pricefixing standard in CBS causes problems in an otherwise sound decision.
THE PER SE RULE WITH A MARKET-FUNCTIONING
EXCEPTION V. THE RULE OF REASON

The Application of the Per Se Rule in CBS
The court of appeals in CBS found that television networks
could obtain performance rights either by purchasing ASCAP's
blanket license or by negotiating directly with individual copyright
owners. 49 The court used this finding to determine that the blanket
license was not illegal block-booking, which requires coercion. 50
The court could not find coercion where the blanket license was
not the only licensing scheme, and thus "dispose[d] of the charge
that the blanket license involve[d] . . . illegal . . . block-book-

ing." 5 1 Consequently, the sole issue before the court was whether
the blanket license was "a price-fixing mechanism in restraint of
52
trade."
The charge that there is a restraint of trade by price-fixing is
founded upon the conception that when any group of sellers or
licensors continues to sell their products through a single agency
with a single price, competition on price by individual sellers has
been restrained ....

[E]ven if the members of the combination

are willing not only to join in the blanket license, but also to sell
their individual performing rights separately, the combination is
nevertheless a 'combination which tampers with price structures
[and therefore] engage[s] in an unlawful activity.' 53
The CBS court thus labeled the blanket license a price-fixing mechanism. 54 Although the availability of a direct market provides a defense to a charge of block-booking,5 5 it is not a defense to a charge
of price-fixing since the blanket license affects the individual
copyright owner's desire to negotiate a separate contract. In fact,
49.
50.

CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1977).
See note 15 supra and accompanying text.

51. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 138.
53. Id. at 135-36 (citations and footnote omitted).
54. The court reached this conclusion summarily, stating: "There is no doubt
that .. . a blanket license . . . is the result of at least the threshold elimination of
price competition .... Id. at 136.
55. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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the availability of a direct market deprives ASCAP of its only defense to the price-fixing charge. 56 This is so because "in the case of
ASCAP blanket licenses . . . the 'Per Se Rule with a MarketFunctioning Exception' . . . holds that price-fixing is per se illegal
except where it is absolutely necessary for the market to function at
all." 5 7 Since the market could theoretically function through the
individual licensing scheme, the blanket license is per se illegal. In
other words, the rule permits a court to find price-fixing and still
not enjoin the blanket license, only if performance rights cannot be
obtained from another source. 5 8 The court found ASCAP guilty of
price-fixing because an alternative to the blanket license was available. Thus, the decision turned solely on the availability of a direct
market.
The Second Circuit's decision in CBS is flawed by its application of the "Per Se Rule with a Market-Functioning Exception."
The court recognized that factors other than the unavailability of a
direct market could deem the blanket license a market necessity. 59
However, the court dismissed these other factors with a rigid ap60
plication of the rule.
The CBS court observed:
The extraordinary number of users spread across the land, the
ease with which a performance may be broadcast, the sheer volume of copyrighted compositions, the enormous quantity of
separate performances each year, the impracticabilityof negotiating individual licenses for each composition, and the ephemeral
nature of each performance all combine to create unique market
61
conditions for performance rights to recorded music.
The court thus indicated the reasons for allowing ASCAP members
to pool their copyrights in the form of blanket licenses. However,
the court could not conclude that the blanket license was a market
necessity because the rigidity of the rule'required the decision to
turn solely on the availability of a direct market. Rather, the court
reasoned that if a direct market could exist, "[it . . . follow[s] a
fortiori that the direct negotiating market can surely exist if the
blanket license is eliminated." 62 Thus, the court's reasoning is in
56. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1977).
57. Id. at 136.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See text accompanying note 17 supra.
CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977).
See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
Id. at 138.
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direct contradiction to its statement that individual negotiations are
impracticable. 63 The finding that a direct market exists should not
provide the justification necessary for eliminating the blanket license
where the direct market cannot function effectively.
The court considered ASCAP's contention that the provision in
the 1950 consent decree assuring a reasonable fee for a blanket
license 64 is a defense to price-fixing. The CBS district court 65 and
the K-91 court 66 accepted this defense, but the court of appeals
rejected it. 6 7 This rejection was based on the court of appeals's
observation that "[n]on-parties who did not participate in the settlement, and who are affected by ASCAP's activities may challenge
them under the antitrust laws." 68 Additionally, the court observed
that a judicial determination of a reasonable price was not a defense to price-fixing, "absent the justification of market necessity." 69 The court's conclusion, that a reasonable price set by a
judge is not as desirable as a competitive price, is sound. However,

the rejection of the reasonable price defense is limited to those
future cases where there is no market necessity. In light of prior
case law rejecting reasonable price defenses without considering
market necessity, 70 it is at least questionable whether market ne63. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
65. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d
130 (2d Cir. 1977).
66. K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1967).
67. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1977). The court of
appeals also rejected the lack of coercion in ASCAP's licensing scheme as a defense
to price-fixing. The court stated that the district court accepted this defense. Id. at

138. However, the court misinterpreted the manner in which the district court dealt
with this defense. The district court accepted the lack of coercion as a defense to a
charge of block-booking, not to a charge of price-fixing. In fact, in so doing, the
district court relied on Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969), and Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950), both of which dealt with block-booking. See CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F.
Supp. 737, 748-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
68. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). The Supreme Court in United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), observed that "[tlhe reasonableness of prices
has no constancy due to the dynamic quality of business facts underlying price structures. Those who fixed reasonable prices today would perpetuate unreasonable
prices tomorrow, since those prices would not be subject to continuous administrative supervision and readjustment in light of changed conditions." Id. at 221. In accord with Socony, the court of appeals in CBS rejected the reasonable price defense
to a charge of price-fixing. The court rejected this defense despite the provision in
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cessity should have been considered at all in the CBS court's rejection of that defense.
Further, the court neglected to consider sufficiently the parties' stipulation that not all performance rights can be obtained in a
direct market. 7 1 However, it should be noted that "musical compositions are substantially interchangeable and that for any proposed use there are several, if not scores, of compositions which
are equally suitable." 72 While consideration of the stipulation could
not, under the rule applied, warrant labeling the blanket license a
market necessity, it could provide a more complete discussion of
the performance rights market. The court labeled the blanket
license a price-fixing mechanism, thus leaving little room for discussion. A more thorough analysis could have been accomplished
through the application of a more flexible rule.
The Rule of Reason
The rule of reason, as articulated in United States v. American
Tobacco Co. ,73 defines an illegal restraint of trade through pricefixing to include only those "acts or contracts or agreements or
combinations which [operate] to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the
due course of trade . . . ."74 In deciding whether there is a restraint of trade through price-fixing, the public interest in the "individual right to contract" 75 and in the "movement of trade" 76
should be considered. The rule of reason would thus allow consideration of the purpose and effect of the blanket license, thereby
providing a more thorough analysis than that provided by an application of the "Per Se Rule with a Market-Functioning Exception."
If the rule of reason were applied in CBS, the legal inconsistencies of the decision could be reconciled. Since the case dealt
the 1950 consent decree assuring a reasonable fee for a blanket license. CBS, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 138 n.23 (2d Cir. 1977). But see K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967). The K-91 court reasoned that ASCAP could
not be guilty of price-fixing as long as it complied with the consent decree provision
assuring a reasonable price. Id. at 4. However, the court stated that the case did not
call for an answer to "whether a consent decree . . .can immunize against further
prosecution for violation of the antitrust law." Id. at 3.
71. See CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562
F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
72. Id. at 752.
73. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
74. Id. at 179 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
75. Id. at 180.
76. Id.
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with a concededly "unique" industry, 77 a rule based on reason
would assure a logical basis for the same result reached by the
court. A rigid rule applied to a unique industry can only lead to a
strained interpretation of fact and law.
The CBS court applied the "Per Se Rule with a MarketFunctioning Exception," thus basing its decision on the availability
of a direct market. 78 Yet the rule of reason would have been a
more useful mode of analysis; under this test, various factors could
have been given due consideration, thus not restricting the court's
analysis to the availability of a direct market. Such factors are: (1)
whether the blanket license is a market necessity despite the
availability of a direct market; (2) whether a reasonable price defense to a charge of price-fixing should be dismissed even if the
blanket license is found to be a market necessity; (3) whether the
stipulation that not all performance rights can be obtained in a direct market should lead to the conclusion that the blanket license is
a market necessity; (4) whether the need for protection from infringement suits should lead to the conclusion that the blanket
license is a market necessity. The CBS court found price-fixing;
hence, discussion centered on the availability of a direct market,
which rendered these other factors irrelevant. The rule of reason
would have allowed a full discussion of all relevant factors and
would have thus produced a logical holding.
Assuming the viability of a direct market, the rule of reason
would not mandate finding the blanket license an illegal pricefixing mechanism. 79 The rule of reason would avoid the restraints of
labeling the blanket license price-fixing, thereby promoting an examination of the purpose and effect of the blanket license. In this
way, the court could have given due consideration to all market factors involved in the purchase of performance rights. The court could
have found that the convenience of bulk licensing is necessary to
the music industry but that the availability of a blanket license
"dulls [the individual copyright owner's] incentive to compete." 80
77.

See note 21 supra and accompanying text.

78. The court "concluded that the ASCAP blanket license . . . is price-fixing
and with respect to the television networks cannot be saved by a 'market necessity'
defense." CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977).
79. On the other hand, if the finding of the viability of a direct market is rejected, the rule of reason would not mandate finding the blanket license lawful. The
lack of a competitive price could prompt the court to fashion a remedy to assure a
competitive price, while at the same time guaranteeing protection from infringement.
See text accompanying note 92 infra.
80. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Thus, a remedy could have been fashioned to assure the availability
of a competitive price while maintaining the blanket license. In
fact, the court accomplished this goal in fashioning its relief."1
Therefore, if the court had applied the rule of reason to the decision, as it did to the relief, a consistent holding would have resulted.
Furthermore, had the court applied the rule of reason, it could
have rejected the reasonable price defense8 2 without considering
whether or not the blanket license is a market necessity. In this
way, the stare decisis effect of CBS would be clear and also consistent with prior case law.8 3 That is, future courts which find a
market necessity with respect to the blanket license would not be
compelled to accept a reasonable price defense to a charge of
price-fixing.
Had the court applied the rule of reason, it could have considered the parties' stipulation that not all performance rights can be
obtained in a direct market. While providing a more thorough
analysis, consideration of this additional factor would not necessarily have changed the outcome in this decision: The need to obtain
performance rights to all compositions could be regarded as minimal,8 4 at the same time that "refus[ing] to license one or more
copyrights unless another copyright is accepted"' 5 is found to be
unreasonable. Thus, although the need to obtain all performance
rights cannot warrant concluding that the blanket license is a market necessity, it can be taken into account in fashioning a remedy.
In fact, in suggesting relief, the court did consider this factor, and
thus provided an analysis which is lacking in the decision.
Application of the rule of reason would have also allowed the
court to address whether the blanket license could be labeled a
market necessity in light of the need for protection from infringement suits. 8 6 For those special groups which must have advance
approval to broadcast copyrighted music, the blanket license is the
only realistic approach to their market needs:
A user of music such as a . . .radio or television station, must
be able to perform all of the compositions currently in demand
by the public. In order to do this feasibly, it must arrange for
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. at 140.
See text accompanying notes 69 & 70 supra.
See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 72 supra.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948).
CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977).
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bulk licenses in advance . . . . If any composition should be
performed without such a license, infringement of copyright results with ... consequent liability . ... 7

The court also neglected to consider the copyright proprietor's
need for protection from infringement. "ASCAP was organized as a
'clearinghouse' for copyright owners and users""" of copyrighted
works. ASCAP's purposes include "secur[ing] payment for the performance for profit of.

.

.copyrighted works"8 9 and providing pro-

tection to users from infringement suits where it would be difficult
to obtain a license directly from the copyright owner. 90 Under a
reasonableness analysis, protection from infringement-a primary
purpose of ASCAP--could be considered. However, the court did
consider this factor in fashioning its relief.91 While the analysis in
the decision did not take all these factors into account, the suggestions for relief did consider these other factors.
The Remedy in CBS
In reversing the district court's decision, the court of appeals
did not grant CBS an absolute remedy, but "offer[ed] some guidelines to the district court in its selection of remedies.- 92 In so doing, the court of appeals considered factors other than the unavailability of a direct market which could warrant concluding that the
blanket license is a market necessity.
The court suggested that the blanket license should not be
enjoined if "a remedy can be fashioned which will ensure that the
blanket license will not affect the price or negotiations for direct
licenses .

.

.

-93 While the "Per Se Rule with a Market-Func-

tioning Exception" mandates enjoining the blanket license, 94 the
rule of reason does not. The rule of reason seeks to promote trade
and to assure the availability of a competitive price. 95 When the
purposes and effects of the blanket license are considered, the blanket license can be deemed necessary, yet lacking in a competitive
87. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 288.
88. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d
130 (2d Cir. 1977).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 742.
91. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
92. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977).
93. Id.
94. See text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra and accompanying text.
95. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
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price. 9 6 Thus, an injunction need not be ordered if a competitive
price can be assured.
In deciding not to enjoin the blanket license, the court observed: "There is not enough evidence . . . to compel a finding
that the blanket license does not serve a market need for those
who wish full protection against infringement suits . . . . "9 The
court thus observed that the need for protection from infringement
suits can justify finding the blanket license to be a market necessity. The court further observed that protection from infringement
can be accomplished at the same time that a competitive price is
provided.98 This statement is in accord with the logic of the rule of
reason.
The court suggested that "ASCAP itself [be] required to provide some form of per use licensing." 99 In this way, protection
from infringement could be provided and a competitive price could
be assured. Licensing by ASCAP of performance rights assures infringement protection and per use licensing 0 0 assures a competitive price. Additionally, licensing by ASCAP of performance rights
would assure the availability of all compositions, even those that
could not be obtained in a direct market. 10 '
The court's suggestion that ASCAP license compositions on a
per use basis in lieu of licensing by individual composers indicates
that a direct market cannot exist. One commentator has noted that
ASCAP "users [need] immediate access to ASCAP's entire range of
compositions, and that it [is] impracticable for them to negotiate
with individual writers and publishers."' 10 2 If this is so, then the
reasoning of the decision, that a direct market can exist, conflicts
with the reasoning of the court's remedy. Further, the court's consideration of protection from infringement conflicts with an application of the "Per Se Rule with a Market-Functioning Exception."
That is, an application of this rule only considers whether or not
there is an alternative to the blanket license and does not consider
protection from infringement.
96. With regard to a blanket license, the court observed: "[T]he determination
of -how much each copyright owner gets from the common pot is an artificial fixing of
the price to that member of the combination for his composition. His distributive
share of the common royalties may be greater than the royalty he would receive in a
free market." CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1977).
97. Id. at 140.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See note 6 supra.
101. See text accompanying notes 71 & 72 supra.
102. Timberg, supra note 3, at 320.
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If the court had applied the rule of reason in its decision, it
could have considered all market factors and concluded that the
blanket license is a market necessity regardless of whether a direct
market is found to exist. 10 3 In fact, if the court had taken this approach, the result would have been a more thorough, consistent,
and logical opinion.
CONCLUSION

The outcome of the CBS decision is sound in that it provides
for a competitive price and maintains blanket licensing. In light of
the need for protection from infringement and the need for efficiency promoted by bulk licensing, it is necessary to maintain the
blanket license.
The court of appeals applied the "Per Se Rule with a MarketFunctioning Exception" and the rule of reason to reach its conclusion. This hybrid approach produced inconsistency in the decision.
If the court had applied only the "Per Se Rule" to the facts of the
case, a thorough analysis could not have been accomplished. If the
court had applied only the rule of reason, analytical inconsistency
would have been avoided, while at the same time all factors in the
performance rights marketplace would have been considered.
Thus, the same result would have been reached in a consistent
and logical manner.
The Second Circuit's approach in CBS is cause for concern
because of its effect on future decisions. The court's faulty reasoning, and not its sound result, will be precedent for future courts.
In this way, the decision may produce unnecessary confusion, litigation, and instability in the television industry. In 1941, the date
of the first consent decree, 10 4 television was still in its conceptual
stage. In 1950, the date of the second consent decree,1 0 5 television
was in its infancy. Since that time, as a communication and entertainment medium, television has had a dramatic and far-ranging
impact. Its future development as a medium is virtually unlimited.
The Second Circuit in CBS had a unique opportunity to construct
the first coherent judicial guideline concerning ASCAP's licensing
scheme; yet the court failed to do so.
Future decisions will have to resolve the problems peculiar to
103.
104.

See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
United States v. ASCAP, [1940-1943] Trade Cases

56,104 (S.D.N.Y.

United States v. ASCAP, [1950-1951] Trade Cases

62,594 (S.D.N.Y.

1941).
105.
1950).
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the performance rights marketplace. CBS will be of little assistance because the Second Circuit failed to fashion effective guidelines for determining the legality of ASCAP's blanket license. Serious consequences may result if a court does not consider all factors
involved in the licensing of performance rights. Any ruling on the
legality of the blanket license must consider all of the following
factors: infringement protection, the need for and effectiveness of
the blanket license, and the possible need to obtain all performance
rights. If all of these factors are not considered, undetected infringement may result. If this happens, the major purpose in ASCAP's
formation-protection from infringement-would be undermined.
Additionally, the copyright proprietors would not be assured of
their well-deserved royalties.
The impact of CBS may determine the outcome of future decisions for years to come. Unless the errors of CBS can be rectified
in the near future, a morass of unnecessary confusion will prevail.

Randi B. Rosenblatt
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